Significant Developments in Ukraine’s Southern Counteroffensive and Russian Military Response.
Last week, it appeared that Ukrainian forces crossed the outermost anti-tank trench within the initial line of defenses that make up the formidable Surovikin Line, extending across the southern regions of Ukraine currently under Russian occupation.
It is plausible that the Ukrainian personnel involved belonged to a reconnaissance unit, and it is equally plausible that they withdrew in response to gunfire from Russian troops employing anti-personnel grenades.
Nevertheless, this incident, which occurred northwest of the occupied town of Verbove in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Oblast, serves as additional evidence that Ukraine’s long-anticipated counteroffensive in the southern region is gaining momentum. This development comes three months after the initial Ukrainian offensives along two significant axes in Zaporizhzhia and the neighboring Donetsk Oblasts.
Over the past few weeks, Ukrainian forces have successfully liberated two crucial towns: Robotyne, situated just a mile to the west of Verbove, and Urozhaine, a strategic Russian stronghold located in the Mokri Yaly River Valley, approximately 60 miles to the east.
This recent turn of events has rattled Russian commanders to the point that they redeployed their 76th Guards Air Assault Division, their last major operational reserve in the region, from eastern Ukraine to the southern front. Elements of the formidable 76th GAAD arrived in Tokmak, a location 12 miles south of Robotyne, and immediately commenced shelling Ukrainian positions within Robotyne.
However, a critical question arises: why did the 76th GAAD, which had been stationed in eastern Ukraine for a specific purpose, relocate to the south? What prompted the Kremlin to believe it was safe to move this division, equipped with three front-line regiments, each consisting of thousands of paratroopers and supported by T-90 and T-72 tanks?
Tom Cooper, an authority on the Russian military, offers a theory. According to Cooper, the 76th GAAD’s redeployment from the east to the south is likely attributable to the Kremlin’s growing confidence in the stability of its positions in and around Bakhmut.
“Strategic Shifts in Eastern and Southern Ukraine Alter Military Dynamics”
Recall that, simultaneously with the launch of their southern counteroffensive, Ukrainian brigades also executed an attack in the east. Guided by the aggressive tactics of the 3rd and 5th army assault brigades, these eastern Ukrainian forces breached the Donbas Canal, a critical defensive position for the Russians, and advanced several miles along the flanks of Bakhmut.
The eastern offensive played a crucial role in supporting the southern thrusts. “The ZSU offensive in the Bakhmut area over the past few months has kept two Russian VDV divisions tied down,” noted Cooper, employing native acronyms for Ukrainian forces (ZSU) and Russian airborne forces (VDV).
With the 96th and 108th Guards Airborne Divisions effectively immobilized, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division became the only available “fire brigade” in the east, capable of swiftly plugging gaps in the Russian lines.
However, a couple of weeks ago, the Ukrainian assault in the Bakhmut region appeared to slow down significantly. Data from NASA’s fire-detecting satellites indicated that hotspots around Bakhmut peaked around August 9 and then subsided, suggesting a notable reduction in fighting activity in the area.
Following this development, it seems that the 96th and 108th Guards Airborne Divisions were able to redeploy their own regiments without exposing Bakhmut to risk. Consequently, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division lost its role as an operational reserve in the east, allowing it to shift its focus toward bolstering Russian defenses in the south.
Ukraine’s Southern Offensive and the Enigma of the Eastern Pause.
In a colorful metaphor, Cooper described the situation as, “The Keystone Cops in Moscow found themselves free to start redeploying a third VDV division to southern Zaporizhzhia.”
Ukraine’s eastern offensive indirectly supported its southern counterpart by keeping Russian reserves tied down. This strategic understanding has been apparent from the outset, raising the question of why the eastern offensive appeared to slow down.
One possibility is that the assault brigades leading the eastern attack paused to recuperate, reorganize, and replenish their ranks after enduring months of grueling combat. Another possibility is that the Ukrainian armed forces lacked sufficient reserves to temporarily replace these assault brigades on the front lines.
The ever-shifting balance of forces along the 600-mile front line of Russia’s 19-month-old broader conflict with Ukraine underscores the intensity of the ongoing struggle. Both sides constantly teeter on the brink, with just a few exhausted brigades or regiments potentially altering the momentum in favor of an eager adversary.
Currently, Ukraine’s forces have the momentum in the south. However, according to Cooper’s analysis, Russia’s forces may possess enough momentum in the east to shift a division between regions without destabilizing entire sectors.